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Summary 
Like other natural resources, water can be mobilized for wealth generation. The spatial expression of 
land resources and of the natural water regime, in terms of quantity, quality, timing, variability and 
availability (or easiness to divert or abstract), coupled with the distribution of power in society, defines 
and underpins the early development of river basins and the pattern of control over water. 
As societies grow and more water is diverted, users located in different parts of a river basin 
find themselves increasingly in interaction through the hydrological cycle. In addition, this cycle is 
constantly redefined by interventions and infrastructures (dams, dikes, irrigation and drainage 
schemes, etc.,) and by the different uses themselves (change in timing, alteration of water quality, 
change in groundwater flows due to abstraction, etc.,). The water regime is thus increasingly man-
made or artificial and the resulting interconnectedness partly amenable to management. 
The paper argues that the consumption of space, the control over water, and the way costs and 
benefits are shifted across scales and social groups can be addressed through a political ecology 
framework. Water use incurs costs and generates externalities that tend to be imposed on third parties. 
River Basin Organizations—in all their diversity—are an attempt to manage resulting conflicts and to 
craft patterns of governance that are more inclusive and conducive to a more equitable and 
environmentally sustainable share of resources. The Chao Phraya river basin, in Thailand, is used as 
an example. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
Patterns of land and water resources development are underlain by the spatial distribution of these 
resources and by their natural regime (hydrological regime in terms of quantity, quality, timing, 
etc.,) but also by the social and political structure of society: distribution of power and agency at a 
given point in time strongly governs access to resources, together with the possibility for a given 
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actor to transfer costs and externalities to other parts of the basin, or to other users or categories of 
people. Spatial dynamics cannot be explained without a historical contextualization, which spells 
out the relationships between the consumption of space and a never-ending process of redefinition 
of the control over land, labor and capital, as well as decision-making power. A particular 
landscape, thus, is the dynamic outcome of actors competing with one another who, through their 
exploitation of resources, alter and reshape the environment (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Crifasi 
2002). 
Such an approach is in agreement with trends in rural geography which define a landscape as a 
"piece of territory, visible to the observer, where a combination of events and interactions are 
inscribed of which only the combined effect is observable at a given point in time" (Deffontaines 
1973). Research in the field of political ecology has long been concerned with human-environment 
interactions. Some strands are more ideological and question the underlying economic, political and 
philosophical dimensions of a "development" which results in environmental degradation (Atkinson 
1991). Other currents focus on the genealogy of environmental discourses, and on the interests, 
ideologies and worldviews from which they stem (Stott and Sullivan 2000), as well as on the concept 
of "nature" proper (Escobar 1999). Other researchers analyze the production of physical landscapes as 
a social artifact which reflects relations of power (material, economic, political, discursive or 
otherwise) and the interactions generated by the types of exploitation or consummation of nature 
resulting from these relations, between actors, spatial units, and more generally between humans and 
nature (Swyngedouw et al.. 2002; Sheridan 1995). 
The approach adopted in this paper draws from the latter strand of studies and departs from the 
classical and technicist vision of river basin development, whereby history is reduced to a linear series 
of phases which reflect growing levels of capital and technology applied to an ever-increasing control 
over waters and the forces of nature. Such a vision, centered on the number of hectares of land 
irrigated and infrastructures (storage or conveyance capacity, etc.,) describes the growing 
anthropogenization of waterscapes without addressing—or even obscuring—the underlying logics, 
interests, power relationships as well as ecological transformations. Changes are always presented as 
an improvement—even if some dysfunctions are identified and must be mitigated—and the spatial and 
social distribution of benefits and costs is overlooked. 
The various water users within a given river basin be they individual or collective, private or 
public, of groundwater or surface water, agricultural or urban, generate externalities (pollution, 
inundations, contamination, risk, shortages, etc.,) the impact of which grows with the 
interconnectedness of users through the hydrological cycle. Critically, this interconnectedness grows 
with basin “closure,” or in other words with the proportion of the basin renewable resources which is 
tapped or consumed (Molle et al. 2004). The possibility that uses or interventions at some point 
generate third-party impacts on other users is increasingly high. 
Consequently, water themes, particularly when seen at the level of river basins where this 
interconnectedness and issues of resource sharing, allocation, and conflict resolution find their 
relevance, are themes of particular interest for the field of political ecology: not only do they refer to 
the societal use of a critical natural resource, but they also have to deal with a much higher degree of 
interactions between users (and also sometimes non-users). The possibility for some actors to impose 
or shift these externalities to other parts of the basin, or to other basins, is the expression of a power 
structure which must be made explicit. Rivers basins thus appear as wider arenas where complex 
interactions between societies and the environment take place and where the definition of a regulation 
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regime—the sanctioned or challenged pattern of access and control over water resources—takes center 
stage. 
This paper describes the development of the Chao Phraya river basin, the main river in Thailand, 
and attempts to show how the joint structuring of the landscape and the waterscape is the reflect of a 
particular historical trajectory, with particular actors and interests at play. The analysis is centered on 
water and—at first—on the delta: it shows how, in the course of time, the intensity and complexity of 
anthropogenic modifications generate a growing interdependency among users in the delta, and also, 
increasingly with the rest of the river basin and beyond. 
2. Reclamation of the delta and spatial expansion 
Because of its contrasted hydrological regime (too much or too little water), its insalubrity, the lack of 
communication routes, and its remoteness from main urban centers, the Chao Phraya delta, just like 
the Mekong or Irrawaddi deltas, long remained underpopulated. Constrained by the lack of labor, 
Siam would draw its wealth from extractivism and international trade, and the development of the 
delta during the Ayutthaya period (1350–1767) remained incipient. The conditions allowing its 
reclamation would only be fulfilled by the end of the nineteenth century. 
2.1 The Ayutthaya and Ratanakosin periods, up to 1850 
We have only limited information concerning land use during the eighteenth and first half of the 
nineteenth century. Travelers such as Turpin or De la Loubère joining Ayutthaya or Lop Buri using 
waterways report the vision of rice fields stretching as far as the eye could see. We know that most of 
these paddy fields correspond to the areas which, even in present time, are cultivated with deep-water 
and floating rice varieties. The use of the flood, which gradually fills up the low-lying areas of the 
floodplain, appears as an optimal cultivation technique in a context of limited labor and technology 
(Hanks 1972). Sown in dry conditions during the first rains of April, these rice varieties—duly 
selected according to the local flood regime (starting date, duration and maximum depth)—benefit 
from the silt brought each year by the flood and provide low yields but with very limited labor 
requirements (principally harvest). Nevertheless, we know that the floodplain was not fully used since 
the surroundings of Ang Thong, for example, were "largely uncultivated" in 1835 (Terwiel 1989). 
Around 1830–1840, the delta and most particularly its lower part was an essentially virgin 
as well as inhospitable area: a mix of malarial swamps, dense bushes, bamboo groves, and high 
savannah-like vegetation, home to elephants and other wild animals (Johnston 1975). Agricultural 
production was limited to river levees where small settlements could be found: sugarcane (south of 
Bangkok, Nakhon Chaisi, Chachoengsao, Chai Nat and surroundings of Kanchanaburi), fruits and 
vegetables (west of Bangkok, vicinity of Samut Songkram and Chachoengsao) and rice (Terwiel 
1989). Paddy fields were usually located close to dwellings, e.g., along the Bang Yai canal, near 
Potharam (irrigation from the Mae Klong river), or along the Tha Chin river. Larger fields could be 
found north and south of Bangkok, along Saen Saep canal, between Ayutthaya and Tha Rua, and in 
the region located between Nakhon Nayok and Chachoengsao (figure 1, greyed areas). 
Rivers and canals were, thus, axes of colonization and agricultural expansion. Although 
their primary function was to allow transportation of people, goods, and armies in case of war, their 
embankments also served to establish homesteads (stilt houses) and, in some instances, to ease 
irrigation or drainage of adjoining land. These canals were nevertheless the manifestation of state 
power, which resorted to corvée labor due to the king for their excavation. Around the middle of the 
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nineteenth century, the Chao Phraya delta was still sparsely populated (410,000 in 1840 according to 
Terwiel, 1989), despite the establishment of its capital, Bangkok, near the river estuary. Settlements 
were linear and stretched along rivers and canals, or were confined to highlands in the upper delta. 
Agriculture was also limited to the most accessible and hospitable portions of the landscape, with 
the exception of the floodplains where floating rice was grown. 
Figure 1. The Chao Phraya delta and successive phases of land reclamation. 
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2.2 Expansion of the agricultural frontier 
The history of the development of rice cultivation in the delta has been addressed by many studies 
and will not be developed here (see for example Ingram 1971; Feeny 1982; Manarungsan 1989; Ishi 
1975). The reclamation of the lower delta has been boosted by the transfer of the capital to 
Thonburi-Bangkok in 1767, fiscal incentives granted by Rama III2 to those who would develop land 
for cultivation, the ban on export and the reduction of tariffs by king Monkhut in 1851, and by the 
signature of the Bowring treaty with the British in 1855 (soon followed by other treaties with other 
western powers): the treaties herald the transition of the rice economy from subsistence to 
integration into world markets. Trade with Europe also benefited from the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869 (van der Heide 1903). 
The development of the delta between 1860 and 1930 can be seen as the result of a struggle 
between the king, the nobility and a gradually emancipating peasantry around the transformation of 
the modes of control of land, capital, and labor (Pasuk and Baker 2000). The consumption of space 
will directly reflect this struggle, but also the ecological diversity of the delta. 
In the history of Siam until the middle of the twentieth century, labor appears as the main 
constraining factor of economic growth (Feeny 1982, 1989; Molle and Thippawal 2000). In a country 
with limited population and uneasy communications, the control of the labor force and of its military 
potential are the fundamentals of the political system of the kingdom. Many laws reveal the 
determination of the king to restrain the possible accumulation of such control in the hands of the 
kingdom's nobility. The success of a war is often gauged by the number of prisoners who can be taken 
back home to augment the local labor force under various types of bondage. In short, land only has a 
subsidiary value and extracting a surplus out of it is predicated upon controlling labor, either in kind or 
through taxes on products. 
During the nineteenth century, the mobilization of labor through the traditional corvée system 
becomes less and less effective (escape of indentured laborers, transfer of the slaves attached to the 
king to the nobility, low labor productivity, etc.,) and the use of Chinese labor, fuelled by a growing 
influx of migrants, becomes the rule. From 1830 onwards, most of the works under state initiative 
employ Chinese laborers, while the corvée system is replaced by an exemption tax. 
During the reigns of Rama III and Rama IV, until the 1880s, newly reclaimed land would have 
been under royal ownership (or under the ownership of nobles who would have undertaken a 
particular project, such as the Damnoen Saduak canal) and were partially distributed to the nobility. 
Plots were cultivated under the corvée regime, by slaves (that), or rented out to other persons (Tanabe 
1978). The nobility was able to extract limited benefit from a land which exceeded the capacity of the 
labor force under its control. Rama IV's care to curtail speculation and wealth accumulation by 
aristocrats led him to enact measures which would limit the power of the nobility: land left 
uncultivated during 5 years would return to the Crown and any canal excavation project would have to 
set apart land for peasants. In the 1890s, a private company (partly endowed with capital coming from 
the king), developed the Rangsit area (see figure 1) and served as a model for a series of similar 
projects launched by aristocrats (e.g., in the West Bank, see figure 1), before eliciting a ban by Rama 
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IV, who in 1902 entrusted the reclamation of the delta to the Department of Canals (which was to 
become the Royal Irrigation Department in 1914). 
From the 1870s onward, the reforms of King Rama IV would definitively abolish the feudal 
system and free a growing labor force who, in turn, would invest itself feverishly in rice cultivation. 
While it formerly relied on bounded labor attached to their position, in the 1980s the nobility finds 
itself looking for tenants to cultivate its land. Faced with climatic vagaries and unstable rice markets, 
these tenants soon found themselves indebted to their landlords or to merchants. The agricultural 
frontier thus became a refuge for farmers fleeing from debts, threats or extortion. This further fuelled 
the expansion of a smallholder agriculture, mainly aimed at subsistence and largely out of reach of the 
administration and urban landlords. Landlordism as well as the issuance of land deeds remained 
confined to the projects developed in the vicinity of Bangkok, preventing merchants and investors to 
accumulate land: the choice to develop the railways rather than irrigation limited the capital available 
for the latter and—for some time—the penetration of the state into the delta hinterland (Feeny 1982). 
The agricultural frontier, partly linked to markets by an army of Chinese peddlers, absorbed a growing 
mass of peasants who had turned made independent. The rice frontier would soon reach the frontiers 
of the delta. 
The development of the lower part of the delta was, thus, the product of a number of factors; 
physical, economic and political, which contributed to its reclamation: Rama IV's political reforms, 
Chinese immigration substituting the Siamese peasant, the provision of capital by the state and by 
private interests, the incentives provided by the international demand for rice. This development 
inscribed itself in the landscape through the progressive penetration and ramification of the canal 
systems, from the main river streams into the hinterland, allowing transportation and a gradual 
regulation of the water regime with regard to irrigation and drainage: this transformation pitted against 
each other different categories of population (Chinese peddlers, peasants, landlords, foreign 
merchants, aristocrats, etc.,) who all attempted to maximize their private benefits through the use of 
the power and agency at their disposal. 
This struggle is still perceptible in today's agrarian landscape. The proximity of Bangkok and 
the mild hydrological regime of the lower delta (delta flats) conditioned the early development of 
extensive rice cultivation, with a corresponding pattern of tenure still very salient in present times. 
Mapping of tenancy and average farm size in the delta (see Molle and Thippawal 2003 and figure 2), 
shows that the large properties granted to or acquired by the king and Bangkok elites are still visible: 
Rangsit, but also the areas located along main canals, belong to urban absentee landlords in their great 
majority, and tenancy is therefore highest.3
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Figure2. Percentage of land cultivated by tenants. 
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This particular historical trajectory also influenced social patterns. Adopting approaches 
developed by cultural ecologists in the 1970s (Wood 1977; Hutterer et al. 1985), some researchers 
have shown how the reclamation of the delta and agrarian/technical change were attuned to both the 
ecological characteristics of the delta and to demographic changes, as well as to wider economic 
circumstances (Hanks 1972). A debate emerged on what could be the implications of such a mode of 
frontier or pioneer colonization on the social structures that emerged thereof. Early on, anthropologists 
had contrasted east-Asian social structures with those—deemed loosely structured—of South-East 
Asia (Embree 1950). Without entering into details, one can both recognize the absence of a strong 
community structure (in particular, as compared to northern or north-eastern Thailand) and the 
emergence of a collective action when circumstances allow it, for example, with regard to the 
organization of funerals, or to the more mundane field of irrigation management (Shigetomi 2002; 
Molle et al. 2001b). 
2.3. Development of the upper delta 
The world demand for grains after World War II led Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to 
investigate and recommend the development of irrigation in the upper part of the delta, through a 
diversion dam (at Chai Nat) which had already been envisioned at the beginning of the century. The 
Greater Chao Phraya Project, or GCPP, was initiated in the 1950s and included a scheme which had 
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been developed in the 1930s on the Tha Chin river as well as another scheme located north of Rangist. 
It allows the irrigation by gravity of the higher land of the upper delta (Takaya 1987). The floodplains 
are also equipped with canals built on top of the river levees, which can not only supply additional 
water in deficit rainy seasons but also during the dry season, although this option was not envisaged at 
the time. Investments were also made in the west bank: the network of canals was expanded, some 
outlets to the Tha Chin and Chao Phraya rivers or to the sea were gated, and the area came to receive 
additional water from Chai Nat dam and thus started the practice of double-cropping in the late 1970s. 
In parallel to this irrigation infrastructure, two large storage dams were constructed on two of the four 
main tributaries of the Chao Phraya: the Bhumipol dam, on the Ping river (1964), and the Sirikit dam 
on the Nan river (1974). Although first designed for hydropower generation and flood control, these 
dams will soon prove paramount in meeting growing water needs in the dry season. 
The last nonirrigated part of the delta was the alluvial fan of the Mae Klong river, to the west of 
the delta. Through a device identical to that of the GCPP, the river was derived at the apex of the fan 
towards a network of gravity canals which were gradually extended between 1980 and 1994 (figure 1). 
In this basin too, two large storage dams were constructed on upstream main tributaries (Sri Nakarin 
(1980) and Khao Laem (1984)). 
2.4. The upland boom 
The implementation of the GCPP occurred at a time of agrarian crisis, characterized by demographic 
pressure and land saturation, drastic taxation of rice cultivation through the rice premium, and the 
domination of landlords and moneylenders. Before ushering in the crisis of the 1970s, the agrarian 
situation was momentarily relieved by the development of the margins of the delta and of more remote 
uplands. This new agricultural frontier and the corresponding “upland boom” was supported by the 
promotion of agro-industry by the Thai state and relatively high market prices for crops such as maize, 
cotton, cassava, sugarcane, and pineapple, and by the construction of a network of strategic roads by 
the American, in their fight against communist insurrection (Delang 2002; Pasuk and Baker 2000). 
Many farmers migrated to this new frontier, some permanently, others for a season or for the harvest 
period only (Molle and Thippawal 2003). And some others, in smaller numbers, tried their luck in the 
industrial sector or in the capital. 
This injection of urban and foreign capital in a new—largely capitalistic—type of agriculture gave 
some breathing space to the delta, at least in the short term. This period (1950–1970) thus signals the 
end of the inner expansion of the delta and a densification of the landscape, with emerging and 
growing interactions with its periphery as well as with its urbanized heart, Bangkok. If, at that time, 
these interdependencies manifest themselves in terms of labor and capital flows, it is the water factor 
which was to take center stage and become a decisive element of coming changes. 
3. The closure of the delta and internal interactions 
3.1. Intensification and diversification 
After the agrarian crisis of the 1970–1976 period, the delta entered a phase of intensification or 
"vertical growth," despite the completion in 1962 of the irrigated system in the upper delta and of the 
first storage dam in 1964, it is only in the 1970s that rice cultivation was intensified. It is only after the 
emergence of dry-season cropping (facilitated by the construction of the Sirikit dam, which regulates 
supply in the dry season), the increase of rice prices in 1973, and the drop in the costs of fertilizers, 
8 
that farmers adopted, gradually but massively, the high-yielding varieties of the Green Revolution, 
which eventually became attractive. Farmers invested substantial outlays in on-farm infrastructures, 
tractors and individual axial pumps. Double and even triple cropping developed and was only 
constrained by the insufficient available stocks in the dry season. 
Dwindling average farm sizes and the long-term decline in real rice prices also contributed to 
fuelling a process of diversification towards cash crops (for the whole delta, the area cultivated with 
non-rice crops moved from 19% in 1978 to 26% in 1993), and also a massive transfer of labor out of 
agriculture to other sectors (more than one million between 1987 and 1997), resulting in the 
stabilization of the population working in agriculture (Molle and Thippawal 2003). The most 
spectacular increase in cash crops was observed in the area of Damnoen Saduak, in the west of 
Bangkok, where the production on raised beds (mostly vegetables and fruits) increased from 50,000 to 
100,000 ha (gross area) between 1963 and 1995. 
3.2. Water as the major production factor: The upper delta 
By the end of the twentieth century, the Chao Phraya delta has become a region fully innerved, 
traversed by multiple canals and rivers, ramified and diverted, and supplied by several reservoirs. 
Agriculture as well as cities depend on the proper functioning and supply of this network. While the 
different parts of the delta had hitherto followed relatively independent trajectories, in accordance with 
their respective comparative advantages and the investments they had benefited, they now find 
themselves in interaction through their competition for water. A modification of water fluxes 
converging to the delta, a change in their allocation or timing, reshuffles benefits as well as the costs. 
Competition between geographic sectors is mostly apparent during the dry season (January to June), 
when available supply is on average slightly above half the potential demand. Accessing water 
becomes a vital objective for economic sustainability of agriculture. 
While the spatial expression of the continuous "development" of the delta remained marked by 
ecological variations, the growing anthropogenic remodeling of the region led to a water regime which 
has become highly "manipulable" and "manageable" by the state. The water regime can be defined by 
a manipulation of the hydrological cycle with specific, yet dynamic, impacts in terms of equity, 
economic efficiency and environmental degradation/conservation. The following subregions can be 
distinguished: 
The western part of the delta is supplied by the Mae Klong river. This river basin, with a 
storage capacity of 11 Bm3 and a limited population, is still significantly an excess basin and allows in 
principle double-cropping over 300,000 ha. Agriculture is nevertheless in competition with the 
hydropower sector since water releases for electricity generation are not always made with enough 
attention to inter-seasonal regulation, which as resulted in occasional shortages in the past.. In such 
instance, the orchards of Damnoen Saduak get water on a priority basis because of the magnitude and 
vulnerability of the capital sunk in these plantations. It is interesting to note that the expansion of this 
area to the north, mostly through the reinvestment of local capital (mainly Sino-Thai), prompts by 
itself a reallocation of water: capital "attracts" water. The impact on other water users is still little 
sensible because water is available in adequate quantity. This privileged situation has nevertheless 
been used by Bangkok to justify a diversion of water for its own supply, which is planned to reach 45 
m3/s. This transfer triggered some protest from residents and from the provincial administration of 
Kanchanaburi and Samut Songkram, who consider that the transfer constrains their future 
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development and will have negative impacts on the ecosystems of the lower Mae Klong (Thitinan 
1994). 
The upper delta is irrigated by five main canals branching off the Chao Phraya river at the 
Chai Nat diversion dam. The partition of the flow of the river at Chai Nat is thus a crucial question 
when one considers that only half of the potential users will be served in the dry season. Ensuring an 
equitable distribution is first faced with technical difficulties: the water level upstream of Chai Nat 
fluctuates and this reverberates on the discharge of the different canals.4 Allocation is also 
problematic. In the 1990s, a rotation system which contemplated serving half of each irrigation unit on 
a 2-year basis was experimented with but failed.5 The analysis of water allocation over a period of 20 
years (Molle et al.. 2001a) revealed an uneven repartition. The west of the delta received more 
substantial supply and could in some places develop a thriving triple cropping, while other subareas 
were served only exceptionally. The official justification is that the western part has been provided 
with good on-farm infrastructures and, as a result has a better control of water and a better economic 
productivity. Part of the difference may also be explained by direct pumping in the Tha Chin river. 
These explanations are somewhat circumstantial and it is notorious that the province concerned 
(Suphan Buri) owes much of its preferential treatment to the influence of its governor, a former prime 
minister (Bangkok Post, May 6, 2005, and May 7, 2005). 
Here too, farmers get organized to "attract" water. Beyond the traditional resort to political 
representatives, notably MPs, several strategies have emerged. The first is to develop aquaculture (e.g., 
Don Chedi area), which requires a frequent renewal of water and justifies a priority supply because of 
the investments made and of its economic profitability. For the higher parts of the floodplains, up to 
now confined to traditional deep-water rice varieties, the objective is to develop on-farm 
infrastructures (leveling, bunding, digging of small farm level canals and drains) in order to be able to 
grow dry-season rice crops and to lay claims for a share of water. Others chose to start dry season 
cropping before the beginning of the official season by using wells or residual waters in drains or 
ponds, thus forcing Royal Irrigation Department to later allocate water to them in order to avoid crop 
losses which would make the news and would trigger political interventions. Others, still, organize 
themselves in Water User Groups to strengthen their claim for water (Molle et al. 2001b). 
3.3. The lower delta 
The lower delta is partly dependent on the upper delta since part of the water it receives from Chai Nat 
is conveyed by the main canals of the upper delta. On the eastern side of the river, Bangkok acts as a 
guarantee: the necessity to maintain the water level in the dense network of canals in order to ensure 
navigation6 and a relative dilution of pollution guarantee priority in allocation. Local water demand is 
also "protected" by the fact that the main feeder canal reaching the area, Rapiphat canal, needs a 
discharge of 40 m3/s to avoid the collapse of its banks. 
Intensive cash-crops (mostly fruit trees) in the lower delta principally expand in areas: a) 
protected from floods; b) which have a regular access to good quality water; c) and, have good access 
                                                     
4 These canals do not have the same sill level and, therefore, are not impacted uniformly. 
5 In dry years, "on" areas would have to be rationed and they did not accept to "pass their turn;" in an excess year, pressure to 
allocate extra water to "off" areas would rise. 
6 The number of persons commuting daily and using boats is estimated at 80,000. 
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roads. The Damnoen Saduak area, in the lower Mae Klong basin, has already been mentioned. Rangsit 
area, north-east of Bangkok, is located at the upstream part of the lower delta and benefits from a 
better access to water: citrus have developed there on a large scale (Saha 1993). 
Agricultural diversification on the west bank, between the Chao Phraya and Tha Chin rivers, is 
more recent. The area is well watered from the north (supply from Chai Nat), from the east (the Chao 
Phraya), and from the west (water from the Mae Klong river is diverted to the Tha Chin and pumped 
onto the west bank in the dry season), but it is also flood-prone. During the last decade some farmers 
have invested in the dyking of their land and, by pumping from adjacent canals, have developed a 
triple cropping of rice, orchards, or even fish and shrimp farming (Szuster et al.. 2003; Szuster 2003). 
3.4. Bangkok 
With a population over seven million, the highest concentration of industries and political power in the 
country, Bangkok appears as the main actor in the delta. The city first developed at the end of the 
nineteenth century owing to rice exports as the heart of a "mercantile delta" (Kaida 2003), thriving on 
maritime commerce. During the cold war, Bangkok was a strategic center of American policy in Asia 
and benefited from the American presence and financial aid, as well as from the investments of the 
Sino-Thai community and, more recently, from foreign capital investments (notably Japanese). The 
growth of the city has shifted the city water demand from 0.46 millions m3/day (Mm3/d) in 1978 to 7.5 
millions m3/d (Mm3/d) in 2000, that is, a multiplication by 16 over a period of 22 years (Molle et al. 
2001a). This demand is principally met by a diversion of 45 m3/s from the Chao Phraya and also by 
groundwater: 95 percent of the water used by the 20,000 industries of the metropolitan area comes 
from the aquifers and the volume abstracted daily is close to 3 Mm3 (equivalent to 36 m3/s), as 
compared with an aquifer recharge estimated at 1 Mm3/day only (TDRI 1990; Christensen and Boon-
Long 1994). Irrespective of the degree of success one can expect from the measures recently taken by 
the government to force industries to resort to tap water, a shift away from wells is not possible 
without a corresponding increase in the amount of water diverted from the Chao Phraya and, thus, 
without causing increased stress on other existing users. The preference of industries for groundwater 
also comes from the fact that it is cheaper, of better quality and reliable, showing that the desired 
substitution will not go without difficulties. 
The federation of Thai industries has hitherto always succeeded in limiting the increase in the 
taxation of wells, with which it has been recurrently threatened (Bangkok Post 2000). The over-
exploitation of aquifers continues and translates into dramatic land subsidence, a third of the capital 
being presently under mean sea level. Externalities in terms of increased sensitivity to floods, costs of 
raising and strengthening dykes, cost of pumping stations, and instability of buildings are enormous 
and distributed over the whole society. 
Through the priority granted to it and its diversions from the Mae Klong river, Bangkok enters 
in competition with the rest of the delta and with neighboring river basins (see §4). By raising its 
protections and embankments it raises the magnitude of floods and shifts the risk onto neighboring 
areas. The lower delta is morphologically a water-spreading area and the gradual shrinking of the 
unprotected area increases the risk and the damages that the latter is to undergo. Dyking by farmers 
who diversify their production adds to this shrinking and therefore further increases the risk faced by 
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those who do not want, or cannot afford, to protect their plot, generating a typical shift of externalities. 
In 1995, the west bank has undergone dramatic flooding with major damage to roads and housing.7
Bangkok is also the source of different types of pollution which impact on other sectors and users, 
and more generally on the environment. 
3.5. Water quality and shifting of environmental externalities 
Interactions within the delta do not limit themselves to water quantity. The degradation of water 
quality by certain types of users is transmitted to other users through the water cycle. The numerous 
canals which criss-cross the lower delta and radiate from the city have been transformed into open 
sewers. Since the coastal line of the delta is now closed,8 polluted water tends to stagnate in and 
around urban areas. This situation not only has a direct impact on public health in a traditionally 
aquatic urban environment but also impacts on peri-urban agricultural production. The reuse of huge 
borrow pits as garbage dumps in the vicinity of Bangkok to stockpile —without any control—all types 
of urban waste has a predictable (yet, so far, little studied) impact on the contamination of aquifers. 
The city and agriculture find themselves in competition with the environment since the control 
of saline intrusion demands a constant minimum discharge of 50 m3/s in the river estuary (and of 45 
m3/s in the estuary of the Tha Chin river)—(Ruangdej 1994). A decrease of the river flow under this 
threshold, as observed in some critical years (e.g., 1999), entails a destruction of orchards (citrus, 
durian etc.,) located along the river and a concentration of pollution. The estuary is also heavily 
contaminated and the river contributes to the pollution of the sea by discharging heavy metals, organic 
matter, BOD load, and nitrates and potassium originating from agriculture (Wijarn 2000 et al.; 
Pornsook and Ekachai 2003). The position of estuarine and coastal ecosystems as the most 
downstream part of the basin, and also as the weakest area in political terms, makes them highly 
vulnerable. A large part of the flux, which controls saline water intrusion, is now generated by 
wastewater released by the city… 
The hydraulic connectivity of the delta also has an impact at a smaller scale: intensive shrimp 
farming, which developed in the east and the west of the lower delta, uses the canals/drains also used 
by rice cultivation and the return flows from rice plots are often loaded with pesticide residues which 
can trigger a high mortality in shrimp populations. Inland brackish water shrimp farming requires 
addition of sea water shipped by tankers and has, in return, an impact on surrounding agriculture, as 
well as on soil quality. The spatial dynamics of this very lucrative –but risky- activity are conditioned 
by ecological factors (water quality) and by the promotion of this activity by large transnational 
agrobusiness groups like Charoen Prokphand (CP), but also by state regulations, which tend to 
concentrate their action on the areas symbolically valued by environmentalists (mangrove) or the 
public at large (the delta, symbol of a rice-based nation) (Vandergeest et al. 1999). However farming 
techniques operating at low salinity levels have recently been developed (Szuster 2003), thus 
weakening the arguments of opponent groups. Abandoned farms in scarified landscapes, remnants of 
the viruses which undermined shrimp farming in the past (including on the coastal area of the delta in 
                                                     
7 Floods being nevertheless part of life of the local population, damage to agricultural production has been limited to the 
foregoing of the second rice crop. 
8 The different streams which connect the delta to the sea are controlled by regulators or dikes which allow the conservation 
of freshwater inland, avoiding its flow to the sea, together with the intrusion of saline water at high tide. 
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the early 90s), do not bode well for the future of this activity that brings fortune but also bankruptcy, 
and is based on a short term mining logic. 
The area of Damnoen Saduak provides a telling example of power struggles around water 
management. The filling up of the Sri Nakarin dam on the upper Mae Klong provoked a drop in the 
discharge reaching the estuary which justified the construction of control structures at the outlet of 
various canals. The creation of a zone of freshwater in the lower part of the basin prompted the 
expansion of vegetable farming, orchards, and aquaculture on a considerable area (totaling almost 
20,000 ha), generating an unmatched agricultural wealth in the country. With the boom of brackish 
shrimp farming (black tiger prawn), some landowners (in particular those who had opted for extensive 
fish farming) are challenging the water regime that gives priority to freshwater (for orchards) and 
militate for an opening of the regulators and a mixture of sea water and freshwater. They support their 
claim by borrowing from environmentalist discourse and by stressing the need to "restore the ecology 
of the river" (Bangkok Post 2004). A modification of the prevailing regime would only shift benefits 
from one area to the other, and from some landowners to others. 
The canal system which serves both for supply and drainage is remarkable in terms of efficiency, 
since all drained volumes can be reused downstream but this canal connectivity also contributes to 
diffuse pollution generated in one point to a much wider area. Environmental externalities of the cities 
onto human health, agriculture, and coastal/marine ecosystems are considerable but the object of few 
measures. 
4. Upstream connections: the delta and its water sources 
The increase in the interactions between users in the delta described earlier was gradually paralleled by 
an increased interaction between the delta and its sources of water, upstream. This is a typical feature 
of "basin closure", whereby the augmentation of water diversions generates a growing interaction 
between upstream and downstream parts of the basin, between surface and groundwater, and between 
different categories of users. The impact of hydrologic variability increases with the rate of 
commitment of resources and increasingly generates critical allocation conflicts (Molden et al. 2001; 
Molle et al. 2004). 
Despite the dams constructed on its tributaries, and because of the unchecked growth of its 
needs (or potential demand) beyond the amount of water available in the dry season, the delta has 
created a situation of potential conflict with the other water users in the basin. Due to the anteriority of 
the massive development of its irrigation infrastructures and to the de facto priority granted to 
Bangkok, the delta claims the lion's share of the basin surface and groundwater and stands as a direct 
competitor of the current and future development of upstream areas. 
The monopolizing of the basin water resources by the delta does not go without contestation 
from other regions and provinces. The middle part of the basin, between the two dams and the apex of 
the delta, also benefited from irrigation projects in the 1980s. Claiming a part of these waters that they 
also consider 'theirs", since they traverse their land, these provinces have obtained irrigation 
infrastructures first aimed at securing rice cultivation in the wet season. It is interesting to note that the 
first feasibility studies admitted that, owing to preexisting irrigation development in the delta, only a 
very limited area could be irrigated in the dry season. Fifteen year later, however, these irrigated areas 
have de facto conquered the implicit right to divert a substantial part of the dry season flow and now 
exhibit cropping intensities comparable to those observed in the delta. In the case of the lower Ping, 
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some sizeable areas with triple-cropping have even been observed, showing the limit of Bangkok's 
centralized control on actual water allocation within the basin. 
Other actors have also challenged the sharing of water privileging the delta. Owing to the 
intervention of the Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP), groups of farmers 
have gained access to pumping stations with a 250 l/s capacity which have soon dotted the course of 
the river and of its tributaries. The combined abstraction of all these users (small and large irrigation 
systems) has totaled 38 percent of the amount of water released by the two dams during the dry season 
of 1998 (Molle et al. 2001a), which gives a measure of the radical process of spatial reappropriation of 
water that is under way. 
The politics of regional development are anchored in a rhetoric of equity between regions, 
which leads poorer regions to claim state investments similar to those received by the regions with 
better comparative advantages. Regions which support the party in power also expect retribution in the 
form of preferential investments. The supply-driven logic of international development banks also 
goes against serious screening of projects. Therefore the logic of water resource development goes 
beyond mere economic rationality and frequently leads to overcommitment of water resources and to 
thereby artificially generating effective water scarcity. In an internal report, the World Bank, which 
funded both the projects in the delta and the subsequent projects in the middle basin, acknowledged 
that the basin was now "overbuilt". 
In the absence of strict rules presiding over the sharing of resources, the legitimization of 
priorities in allocation is established through debates, representations and dominant discourses, that is, 
in a symbolic and discursive arena where the stakes are nonetheless paramount. The hegemony of the 
official discourse on the causes of water shortages is created through the press and television, official 
declarations, and a certain academic literature. Salinity creeping into the Chao Phraya river or 
restrictions threatening the capital are due to farmers' squandering of water and insistence in growing 
rice rather than less water-demanding crops, to El-Niño or to an exceptional drought, and to 
deforestation of the upper basin: common wisdom strongly associates water shortages with the 
disappearing of forests, these natural "sponges" which retain water, alleviating floods and sustaining 
flows in the dry season. 
Although the causal link between deforestation and runoff at the basin level has been 
scientifically largely discredited (Alford 1992 Walker 2002, 2003), its ubiquity in the media (Bangkok 
Post May 2001; Bangkok Post August 2001) and the discourse of Bangkok urbanites reveals a 
propensity to blame ethnic minorities (Delang 2002; Hirsch and Lohmann 1989). It also echoes an 
urban ecologic ideology for which northern Thailand, and the countryside in general, must be 
conserved in order to – in parallel with an idealization of a pre-modern past- be consumed by an eco-
tourism in full development (Rigg and Ritchie 2002). This ideology is, ironically, also strengthened by 
the popular concept of integrated soil and water management, which enjoins us to take into 
consideration the interactions between upstream and downstream parts of a river basin (Bangkok Post 
April 2004). This ideology is effective: it elicited and legitimized programs of reforestation on a large 
scale and the design of new "state enclosures" such as national parks and sanctuaries (Delang 2002; 
Sato 2003). These projects have often been, and are still, carried out to the direct detriment of 
populations whose livelihoods are dependent on these resources. The discourse depicting slash-and-
burn agriculture as nefarious and backward lends support to the eviction of local communities (often 
Hmong people in the north) to the benefit of afforestation which is presented as modern and 
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productive, thus sanctioning a transfer of benefits to the timber industry (or to tourists, in case of 
reservations). 
These programs have been faced with some opposition: NGOs proposed a Community forest 
bill which would recognize the right of communities to manage their own resources. Access to 
information on legal issues, the support of NGOs and activists, and the Thai citizenship of some ethnic 
groups have been found to be the main determinant of success in the recognition of community rights 
on the ground (Johnson and Forsyth 2002). Access to upland resources by local populations is gained 
through a political struggle pitting against each other agro-industrial interests, activists, rural 
communities and the state, through its line agencies and local administrative representations. 
"Weapons" are money, but also information on rights and laws, media, international NGOs, ethnic 
stereotypes and mainstream discourses on the causes of the water crises. 
Another fascinating example of the power of the dominant discourse is the ban on logging 
which followed a heated debate on concessions granted by the government (Lohmann 1995) and the 
catastrophic inundations of 1988 (Lang 2002). Here again, despite the lack of scientific evidence of a 
causal link between deforestation and flooding on a large scale (CIFOR 2004), the relative success of 
this ban (followed by a ban in China in 1998 issued for the same reasons) and the vitality of the illicit 
logging business have shifted tree felling to other countries with weaker state control such as Laos, 
Cambodia, Myanmar and Indonesia : this situation provides a striking example of the power of an 
urban discourse which de facto links the increased vulnerability of investments in floodplains to the 
looting of natural resources in poorer neighboring countries. 
Popular discourse on the lack of water is also efficient in justifying the development of more 
water resources. In this version, farmers are mobilized in a positive fashion and their "needs", 
stigmatized by dry and parched fields in the dry season, are emphasized in order to legitimize the 
construction of new dams or interbasin transfers. Supplying water to farmers becomes an endless 
mission, where benefits are obvious but whose costs are hardly mentioned.9
In contrast with the view of economists, for whom reallocation of water between sectors 
should simply follow the gradient of economic productivity, the spatial redistribution of a finite 
resource, or the grabbing of the resources from neighboring basins, is a process which is highly 
political and which proceeds along the "path of least resistance" (Molle and Berkoff 2005). The 
solutions found by cities to meet their growing needs generally minimize political costs and maximize 
gains to decision-makers. It is tempting to impose the environmental and economic costs of a water 
transfer to regions or categories of population with a lower bargaining power, and the financial costs 
to the country as a whole, while benefits tend to accrue to elites and urban investors whose profits are 
linked to the continuous growth of urban metabolism. The weakest parties are in general the next 
generations (affected by the exhaustion and contamination of aquifers, and the loss of biodiversity) 
and the environment (basin closure almost invariably provokes severe environmental stress, at least at 
the beginning). 
                                                     
9 Refer to this declaration of an official at the Royal Irrigation Department: “water distribution doesn’t completely cover 
those irrigation areas; we’ve lost a balance between storage and distribution”, comments a high-level officer …We know the 
problem… if water can’t be distributed to people, maximum benefits will not be attained” (Bangkok Post, 28 December 
2003). 
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In the present case it is interesting to note that a reduction of the allocation to agriculture is not 
formally considered10 and that conventional engineering supply-augmentation options are still 
favored. Bangkok has first imposed a transfer from the Mae Klong basin, which constituted the less 
stressing option. In 1999, a new dam with a capacity of 750 Mm3 was built on the Pasak river, which 
joins the delta on its eastern side, at the request and under the patronage of His Majesty the King, with 
the main objective to protect Bangkok from the floods. By way of compensation to the provinces 
affected by the impoundment, an irrigation scheme of 25,000 ha has been added downstream of the 
dam, instead of earmarking the new water stock for alleviating the situation in the lower delta in 
general and in Bangkok in particular.11 Each new reservoir comes with a new irrigation area and 
recurring shortages justify the mobilization of more distant or costly water. The last project under 
consideration contemplates pumping water from the Salween river12 to increase the inflow to 
Bhumipol dam via a tunnel which is to be excavated through the mountain range. 
5. Conclusions 
This retrospective on the development of the Chao Phraya delta distinguished three phases. The first 
phase corresponded to the gradual reclamation of the delta. The spatial distribution of populations and 
the differentiation into varied types of agricultural systems appeared as the combined result of 
contrasting ecological conditions and of a struggle for the control of labor and land between the king, 
the nobility, and an emancipating peasantry. The reclamation of the delta is tightly linked to King 
Rama IV's political reforms as well as to the development of the international rice market. 
After a quasi-total occupation of the delta, the last highland and the terraces of the Mae Klong 
were included in large-scale irrigation systems supplied by the diversion of the Chao Phraya and Mae 
Klong rivers. These infrastructures, combined with the construction of major storage dams and, later, 
with o the Green Revolution, allowed the intensification of rice cultivation, double/triple cropping, and 
agricultural diversification. Water supply, however, remained limited and could not meet the potential 
demand in the dry season. This deficit resulted in a tension on water resources, and in a competition 
between sub-regions and economic sectors, which pushed the various users to look for options and 
strategies aimed at maximizing their access to water. Water quality became a major aspect of conflicts 
within a delta that is endowed with very high hydraulic connectivity. 
Water allocation becomes a central issue but it is readily apparent that the pressure generated 
by a fully irrigated delta and by a capital whose needs can grow up to 10 percent a year is shifted onto 
the upper basin and onto other basins as well. The search for more resources results in conflict with 
sub-regional development strategies and with the overall growth of water abstraction in the basin. The 
struggle for water is best fought through projects imposed by the state or urban interest groups, but 
also through symbolic and discursive means. The construction and control of a mainstream discourse, 
which defines the causes of (and the remedies to) water scarcity allows to further particular agendas 
and projects. 
                                                     
10 Much to the contrary, Thailand is considering multiplying its irrigated area by a factor two or three through the « Water 
Grid » project of the Thaksin administration (see Molle 2005). 
11 The same situation was observed with regard to the on-going construction of a dam on the Nakon Nayok river, which also 
contributes to the delta. 
12 This river defines part of the frontier between Myanmar and Thailand. It is planned to divert a total annual volume of 3.8 
Bm3. 
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This paper emphasizes that the evolution of the delta is not merely a linear process, whereby 
technical change would allow ever-increasing control of nature and social benefits. In reality, the 
consumption of space, the modes of exploitation, the process of intensification and diversification, 
migrations, etc. are all linked to a manipulation of the hydrological cycle (in terms of quantity, quality 
and timing) which cannot merely be reduced to issues of technical or economic efficiency. The spatial 
expression of these changes defines the way in which costs and benefits are distributed among sub-
regions and among various categories of actors. 
A political ecological approach emphasizes how power relationships inscribe themselves in the 
landscape, and how the resulting environmental changes, in return, impact on society or segments of 
it. This paper revealed how the organic development of the delta was staged through the competition 
of actors as varied as the farmers of the various sub-regions, urban and industrial interest groups, 
provinces in the basin as well as neighboring ones, the hydro-power and agrobusiness sectors, 
politicians, line agencies, green NGOs, the media and the academia. Interactions are also spatially 
hierarchized: Bangkok tends to dominate the delta, the delta tends to maintain (with some difficulties) 
its privileged access to water in the basin and to impose its logic to ethnic minorities in the north, and 
the basin tends to expand its grasp on the resources of neighboring basins and countries. Access to 
water resources is constantly challenged and redefined and the challenge is now to design governance 
mechanisms at the basin level which can regulate this access in a more open, equitable and sustainable 
manner. 
 
6. Bibliography 
Alford, D. 1992. Streamflow and sediment transport from mountain watersheds of the Chao Phraya basin, 
northern Thailand: A reconnaissance study. Mountain Research and Development 12(3): 257-268. 
Bangkok Post. 10 May 2001. Illegal logging a ‘tragic lesson’, by Kultida Samabuddhi. 
Bangkok Post. 11 April 2004. Rivers need understanding, by Supara Janchitfah. 
Bangkok Post. 20 August 2001. Naked hills blamed for flash floods, mudslides, by Kultida Samabuddhi.. 
Bangkok Post. 11 June 2000. Farmers say no to water burden. 
Bangkok Post. 28 December 2003. Call to build water supply networks: Reservoirs cannot meet agri demand. 
Bangkok Post. 6 May 2005. MP denies Banharn holds dam gate keys. 
Bangkok Post. 7 May 2005. MP says log book is proof. 
Bryant, R.L.; Bailey, S. 1997. Third World political ecology. London: Routledge. 
Cheyroux, B. 2003. Fruits and vegetables in Thailand’s rice bowl: The agricultural development of poldered 
raised bed systems in the Damnoen Saduak area. In Perspectives on Social and Agricultural Change in the Chao 
Phraya Delta, edited by François Molle and Thippawal Srijantr, Bangkok: White Lotus. pp.157-176. 
Christensen, Scott R.; Arreya Boon-Long. 1994. Institutional problems in Thai water management, TDRI, 54 p. 
CIFOR 2004. Forests and floods: drowning in fiction or thriving on facts. Bogor, Indonesia: CIFOR. 
Contreras, A.P. 2001. Forests as social construction: political ecological reflections on the production of 
knowledge in forest management and governance. A paper presented at the International Studies Association 
Conference held in Chicago, 21 – 24 February 2001. 
Crifasi, R. R. 2002. The political ecology of water use and development. Water International, 27(4):492-503.  
Deffontaines JP. 1973. Analyse du paysage et étude régionale des systèmes de production agricole, Economie 
Rurale, N° 98, pp. 3-13. 
17 
Delang, C.O. 2002. Deforestation in Northern Thailand: The result of Hmong farming practices or Thai 
development strategies?” Society and Natural Resources 15: 483-501. 
Escobar, A. 1999. After Nature: Steps to an anti-essentialist political ecology. Current Anthropology 40 (1): 1-
30. 
Feeny, David. 1982. The political economy of productivity: Thai agricultural development, 1880–1975. Revised 
version of Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Asian Studies Monographs, No. 3, 238 p. 
Feeny, David. 1989. The decline of property rights in man in Thailand, 1800–1913. Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 49, No. 2. 
Foster, Brian L. 1977. Adaptation to changing economic conditions in four Thai villages.” In Cultural-ecological 
perspectives on Southeast Asia, edited by William Wood, pp. 113–29. 
Greenberg, J.B.; Park, T. 1994. Political ecology. Journal of Political Ecology 1: 1-12. 
Hirsch, Philip; Lohmann, Larry. 1989. Contemporary politics of environment in Thailand. Asian Survey 29 
(4):439-451. 
Hutterer, K.L.; Rambo, A.T.; Lovelace, G (Ed.). 1985. Cultural values and human ecology in Southeast Asia. 
Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan. 
Ingram, James C. 1971. Economic change in Thailand 1850–1970. Kuala Lumpur, London, Singapore: Oxford 
University Press, 350 p. 
Ishii, Yoneo (ed.). 1978. Thailand: A rice-growing society. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 339 p. 
Johnson, C.; Forsyth, T. 2002. In the eyes of the state: Negotiating a "rights-based approach" to forest 
conservation in Thailand. World Development 30:9 1591-1605. 
Johnston, D.B. 1975. “Rural society and the rice economy in Thailand: 1880–1930.” PhD thesis, Yale 
University, 443 p. 
Kaida, Y. 2003. Agrarian versus mercantile deltas: The Chao Phraya Delta in the context of the great deltas of 
monsoon Asia. In François Molle and Thippawal Srijantr (eds.), Perspectives on Social and Agricultural Change 
in the Chao Phraya Delta (Bangkok, White Lotus) 
Lang, G. 2002. Deforestation, floods, and state reactions in China and Thailand. Working Papers Series No. 21. 
Hong Kong: Southeast Asia Research Center. 
Lipietz, A. 1999. Qu'est-ce que l'écologie politique ? La Grande Transformation du XXIe siècle, avec nouvelle 
préface, La Découverte, Paris, 123 pages. 
Lohman, L. 1995. Visitors to the Commons: Approaching Thailand’s “environmental” struggles from a western 
starting point. In Ecological resistance movements: the global emergence of radical and popular 
environmentalism, edited by Bron Raymond Taylor. Albany: State University of New York Press, 109-126. 
Molden, D.; Sakthivadivel, R.; Samad, M. 2001b. Accounting for changes in water use and the need for 
institutional adaptation. In Intersectoral management of river basins: Proceedings of an international workshop 
on "Integrated Water Management in Water-Stressed River Basins in Developing Countries: Strategies for 
Poverty Alleviation and Agricultural Growth," Loskop Dam, South Africa, 16-21 October 2000, 73-87, ed. C. L. 
Abernethy. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Institute; Deutsche Stiftung für Internationale 
Entwicklung. 
Molle F.; Thippawal Srijantr. 2003: Between concentration and fragmentation: the resilience of the land system 
in the Chao Phraya Delta. In Perspectives on Social and Agricultural Change in the Chao Phraya Delta, edited 
by François Molle and Thippawal Srijantr, Bangkok: White Lotus. pp.  
Molle, F.; Berkoff, J. 2005. Cities vs. Agriculture: Revisiting intersectoral water transfers, potential gains and 
conflicts. IWMI Research Report. Draft. 
Molle, F.; Srijantr, T. 2000. Les systèmes agraires du delta du Chao Phraya face à la crise, Tiers Monde. 
Molle, François; Chompadist, Chatchom; Srijantr, T. and Jesda Keawkulaya. 2001a. Dry-season water allocation 
and management in the Chao Phraya basin. Research Report submitted to the European Union, Research report 
n°8, Bangkok, 278 p. 
18 
Molle, François; Nittaya Ngernprasertsri, Sudsawasd, Savakon and Chatchom Chompadist. 2001b. Patterns of 
social interaction and organization in irrigated agriculture: the case of the Chao Phraya Delta, DORAS Project, 
Research Report N°9, Kasetsart University, Report submitted to the European Union, Bangkok, 150 p. 
Molle, François; Mamanpoush, A.; Miranzadeh, M. 2004. Robbing Yadullah’s water to irrigate Saeid’s garden: 
Hydrology and water rights in a village of central Iran. IWMI Research Report No 80. 
Molle, F. 2005. Irrigation and water policies in the Mékong region: Current discourses and practice. Mékong 
Water Governance Network/IWMI – Research Paper. Draft 
Molle, François; Dao Thê Tuân. 2005. Water control and agricultural development: Crafting deltaic 
environments in Southeast Asia. In: IWHA. Water Politics and Control: Historical and Contemporary, I B 
Tauris, London. 
Nickum, J.E.; Rambo, A.T. 2003. Methodology and major findings of a comparative project on environmental 
consciousness in Hong Kong, Japan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Southeast Asian Studies 41(1): 5-14. 
Panya, Opart; Solot Sirisai. 2003. Environmental consciousness in Thailand: Contesting maps of eco-conscious 
minds. Southeast Asian Studies 41(1): 59-75. 
Pasuk Phongpaichit; Baker, Chris. 1995. Thailand: Economy and politics. Oxford University Press, 450 p. 
Pornsook Chongprasith and Ekachai Praekulvanich. 2003. Coastal pollution management in Thailand. Water 
Quality Management Bureau, Pollution Control Department, Bangkok. 
Rigg, J.; Ritchie, M. 2002. Production, consumption and imagination in rural Thailand. Journal of Rural Studies 
18(2002): 359-371. 
Ruangdej Srivardhana. 1994. Water Use Conflicts in Bangkok Metropolitan Region, Thailand. In Metropolitan 
Water Use Conflicts in Asia and the Pacific, James E. Nickum and K. William Easter, eds. Boulder, Colorado,: 
Westview Press, p. 137. 
Saha, P.K. 1993. Agriculture development in the tropical Asia: A case study in the North Rangsit irrigation 
project, Thailand. Ph. D. thesis, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok. 
Sato, Jin. 2003. Public land for the people: The institutional basis of community forestry in Thailand. Journal of 
Southeast Asian Studies 34(2): 329-346. 
Sheridan, T.E. 1994. Arizona: the political ecology of a desert state. Journal of Political Ecology 1: 1-12. 
Shigetomi, S. 2003. Social structure and local organizations in the Chao Phraya Delta. In Perspectives on Social 
and Agricultural Change in the Chao Phraya Delta, edited by François Molle and Thippawal Srijantr, Bangkok: 
White Lotus. pp: 323-343. 
Stott, P.; Sullivan, S. 2000. Introduction. In Political ecology: Science, myth and power, edited by Stott, P.; 
Sullivan, S., 1-11, London: Arnold. 
Stott, P.; Sullivan, S. 2000. Political ecology: science, myth and power. London: Arnold. 
Subvattana Thaveesilp. 1978. Rice production and rice trade in central Thailand from the reign of King Rama V 
to the reign of King Rama VII. Ph. D. thesis, Chulalongkorn University, 355 p. [in Thai]. 
Swyngedouw, E.; Kaika, M.; Castro, E. 2002. Urban water: A political ecology perspective. Built Environment 
28(2), 124 – 137. 
Szuster, B.; Molle, F.; Flaherty, M.S.; Thippawal Srijantr. 2003. Socio-economic and environmental implications 
of inland shrimp farming in the Chao Phraya Delta. In Perspectives on Social and Agricultural Change in the 
Chao Phraya Delta, edited by François Molle and Thippawal Srijantr, Bangkok: White Lotus. 
Szuster, Brian W. 2003. Shrimp farming in Thailand’s Chao Phraya river delta: Boom, bust and echo, Research 
Report. IWMI, Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, 57 p. 
Takaya, Yoshikazu. 1987. Agricultural development of a tropical delta: A study of the Chao Phraya Delta. 
Monographs of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies. Kyoto University, Vol. 17, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 269 p. 
Tanabe, Shigeharu. 1978. Land reclamation in the Chao Phraya Delta. In Thailand: A rice-growing society, 
edited by Y. Ishii, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, pp. 40–82. 
TDRI (Thailand Development Research Institute). 1990. Water shortages: Managing demand to expand supply, 
Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. 101 p. 
19 
Terwiel, Barend Jan. 1989. Through travellers’ eyes: An approach to early nineteenth-century Thai history. 
Asian History Center, Australian National University, Bangkok: Duang Kamol Editions, 290 p. 
Thitinan Pongsudhirak. 1994. Water allocation conflicts in central Thailand. In Water conflicts, Bangkok: 
Thailand Development Research Institute, pp. 251–272. 
Vandergeest, P.; Flaherty, M.; Miller, P. 1999. A political ecology of shrimp aquaculture in Thailand. Rural 
Sociology 64 (4):573-596. 
Van der Heide, J. Howard. 1906. The economical development of Siam during the last half century. Journal of 
the Siam Society. 
Walker, Andrew. 2002. Forests and water in Northern Thailand. Technical Report Working Paper No.37, 
Resource Management in Asia-Pacific, (RMAP) Program, RSPAS, Canberra: Australian National University. 
Walker, Andrew. 2003. Agricultural transformation and the politics of hydrology in Northern Thailand. 
Development and Change 34(5): 941-964. 
Wijarn Simachaya, Pimon Watanamahart, Vuttichai Kaewkrajang; Akaluk Yenpiem. 2000. Water quality 
situation and its disaster in the Chao Phraya Delta. In Proceedings of the International Conference “The Chao 
Phraya Delta : Historical Development, Dynamics and Challenges of Thailand’s Rice Bowl”, December 2000, 
Kasetsart University, Bangkok, Volume 1, pp. 199-218. 
Wood, W. (Ed.) 1977. Cultural-ecological perspectives on Southeast Asia. Athens: Ohio University, Center for 
International Studies. 
20 
